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Abstract 
We analyze a key problem in organization theory and design, namely the potential tension 
between authority (i.e., the power to make decisions which guide the decisions of another 
person) and the discretion of employees (i.e., the ability of an agent to control resources 
including his own human capital). The problem is rooted in the fact that in organizations, 
decisions rights are always loaned rather than owned; a hierarchical superior can always in 
principle overrule a hierarchical inferior.  We provide an integrative treatment of the tensions 
that are involved in the interaction between authority and discretion, and the motivational 
problems that may result from this tension.  We discuss how these problems may be checked by 
credible managerial commitments and other mechanisms. The framework is then applied to an 
analysis of new organizational forms, specifically internal hybrids.  Thus, the framework adds to 
the understanding of the costs and benefits of alternative organizational forms.  
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Introduction 
An important problem in organization theory (including organizational economics) is the tension 
in organizations between authority  that is, the power to make decisions which guide the 
decisions of another person in the context of incomplete contracts and uncertainty (e.g., Coase 
1937; Simon 1951, 1991)  and the discretion of agents, that is, the ability of an agent to control 
or consume resources including his own human capital (Crozier 1964; Barzel 1997; Kirsten Foss 
2001) (Vancil and Buddrus 1979; Williamson 1996; Baker et al. 1999, 2001).  In the 
interpretation that we develop in this paper, the tension arises from beneficial delegated discretion 
being hard to sustain under the property rights structure characterizing the firm in which 
delegated decision rights are always “loaned, not owned” (Baker et al. 1999), so that those who 
hold ultimate decision rights (i.e., authority) may use this power to renege on delegation.  We 
argue that such reneging is likely to harm employee motivation, in turn harming organizational 
performance; hence, the tension between authority and delegated discretion.  We analyze this 
tension, and argue that a number of factors, such as credible managerial commitments to not 
harmfully intervene, may keep the problems at bay.1  Moreover, we develop the argument that 
these factors differ across organizational forms, such as traditional hierarchy and new 
organizational forms.  In other words, the tension between authority and discretion and how 
(well) it is resolved helps to determine organizational form. 
  To illustrate the relevance of the tension between authority and discretion (as well as its 
application to new organizational forms), consider the much cited case of  organizational 
turnaround in Danish hearing aids producer, Oticon A/S (Peters 1992; Morsing and Eiberg 1998) 
in the beginning of the 1990s.  The radical organizational form that was introduced in Oticon in 
1991 was a very flat one, encompassing only two hierarchical levels.  It was almost entirely 
project-based and characterized by substantial delegation of decision rights.   For example, 
anybody could suggest, initiate and head a product development or marketing project, or sign up 
to any project, the idea being to emulate the spontaneous forces of market organization  a key 
notion in recent work on new organizational forms (e.g., Zenger 2002).  The organizational 
design formally implied little exercise of central authority; thus, the role of the central 
management committee was only to ratifie or reject projects after strict and transparent criteria, as 
well as to monitor projects on a regular basis.  However, in actuality, the CEO possessed very 
considerable decision-making powers, and exercised these by intervening in projects, closing 
                                                 
1 Much of our reasoning relates to the notion of trust.  However, we do not use this notion because of its many 
connotations, and because our discussion may only capture some of these connotations. 
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down projects, etc. He arguably did so because he perceived certain unfortunate spillover effects 
of the strong delegation of discretion that characterized the Oticon spaghetti organization (e.g., 
employees could join as many projects as they pleased, leading to problems of allocating time).  
The motivation loss caused by this managerial intervention eventually led to the demise of the 
radical organizational form in Oticon (Nicolai Foss 2001).    
 The Oticon case suggests that there may be substantive implications for organizational 
design in the distinction between authority and discretion, perhaps particularly for the design of 
new organizational forms.  We examine these implications, drawing on insights from various 
literatures, particularly 1) organizational economics (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1992; Williamson 
1996; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999, 2001) and 2) political economy work on credible 
commitments (Kiser and Barzel 1991; Miller 1992; Moe 1997).  We also add ideas from 3) work 
on psychological contracts in organizations (Rousseau 1989), and extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation (Thomas and Velthouse 1990; Osterloh and Frey 2000), and 4) psychological research 
on decision-making (Bazerman 1994).     
 We begin by clarifying the notions of authority and delegated discretion, provide 
explanations of why they (co-)exist in firms, and argue that this implies that the notion of 
authority should be extended beyond the narrow one of order-giving (Coase 1937; Simon 
1951), in particular to also encompass the power to delegate and constrain discretion, as well 
as the ability to veto subordinates’ decisions (“Authority and Discretion: Literature Review 
and Discussion”). Next, the interplay between authority and discretion is examined.  We begin 
by discussing optimal delegation in a stylized framework, and then discuss the motivational 
problems that may arise when managers exercise authority by reneging on the delegation of 
discretion.  This brings the factors that keep such reneging at bay into focus (“Authority and 
Discretion:  Tensions, Credible Commitments, and Implicit Contracts”).  We end with an 
application of the framework to a comparison of internal hybrids and traditional hierarchies, 
and discuss various managerial implications (“Implications for New Organizational Forms”).    
Authority and Discretion: Definitions and Discussion 
The concept of authority is closely linked to the sociological literature on bureaucracy (e.g. 
Weber 1947; Thompson 1956).  In turn, the notion of discretion is mainly related to the 
economics literature on organizations (Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Barzel 1997). Perhaps 
because of this disciplinary difference, the relations between the two concepts have not been 
extensively explored. Moreover, particularly the concept of authority comes with a multitude 
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of meanings.   In the following, we offer definitions of, and rationales for, authority and 
discretion.   
Defining Authority and Discretion 
 Organization and behavioral theories, usually drawing on sociology and psychology, 
present a number of interpretations of authority (Weber 1921; Thompson 1956; Grandori 2002). 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to present a full review and critical evaluation of the 
multitude of definitions and ideas regarding the concept of authority.  For our purpose, the 
concepts of authority offered by Simon (1951, 1991) serves as a sufficient starting point.2  Simon 
(1951) defines authority as obtaining when a “boss” is permitted by a “worker” to select actions, 
A0 ⊂ A, where A is the set of the worker’s possible behaviors.  More or less authority is then 
simply defined as making the set A0 larger or smaller.  Simon develops a model, where in the first 
period, the prospective employee decides whether to accept employment or not.  In this period, 
none of the parties know which actions will be optimal, given circumstances.  In the next period, 
the relevant circumstances as well as the costs and benefits associated with the various possible 
tasks are revealed to the employer.  He then directs the worker to a task, which  for the latter to 
accept the assignment  must lie within his “zone of acceptance.” An important feature of 
authority thus is that the authority of a superior is constrained by the acceptance of the 
subordinate of the authority. A limitation of this conceptualization is that it is assumes that the 
employer has all the relevant information, the worker being merely a passive instrument who 
reacts to instructions based on this information.  Such a notion is at odds with the exercise of 
authority in modern knowledge-based production, where employees are hired exactly because 
they, in some certain respects, possess knowledge that is superior to that of the employer.   
 However, as Simon (1991: 31) himself pointed out four decades after his initial paper on 
authority, “[a]uthority in organizations is not used exclusively, or even mainly, to command 
specific actions.” Rather, it is a command that takes the form of a result to be produced, a 
principle to be applied, or goal constraints, so that “[o]nly the end goal has been supplied by the 
command, and not the method of reaching it.”   However, usually some aspects of “the method of 
                                                 
2 The first organizational economics explanation of the existence of the authority relation is due to Coase (1937): 
In the presence of uncertainty, contingencies are costly to anticipate and describe in advance, and rather than 
negotiating over each contingency as they materialize and on a spot market basis, an employment contract is 
concluded.  This contract allocates rights to the employer with respect to postponing the decision about what 
services to demand from the employee until the employer obtains the relevant information on which to base the 
decision.  Simon’s approach is essentially the same.  These two contributions still define how economists think 
about authority. Later treatments (e.g., Hart 1995; Williamson 1996) mostly elaborate on the sources of authority 
in terms of ownership or the law.        
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reaching” an end goal are indeed specified, so that employees are seldom granted full discretion.  
Rules are defined for what they can do, and routines and standard operating procedures are 
imposed.  In Simon (1951) (as well as Coase 1937), the only restrictions in the employment 
contract are those that are placed on the use of authority by the employer (i.e., the notion of 
“zones of acceptance”).  However, there are other restrictions in the employment relation, namely 
constraints on the decision rights that are granted to employees (Holmström and Milgrom 1991; 
Jensen and Meckling 1992; Barzel 1997; Holmström 1999). Many kinds of management controls 
may be interpreted as defining, and redefining, the constraints on the decision rights allocated to 
employees.  This suggests a second important function for authority, namely to delegate and 
constrain discretion.  This function is exercised in order to minimize costs associated with 
unwanted spillover effects (i.e., externalities) that arise when decision-making is interdependent 
and employees have discretion.    
Why Discretion?   
 We define discretion is defined as the ability of an agent to control or consume alienable 
resources over which she does not have formal ownership or control the services of her own 
human capital (Barzel 1997); in other words, “discretion” does not encompass control over other 
employees (we justify this later).  “Control” is a key word here.  An agent has control over a 
resource (including his own labor services) when he is able to allocate that resource to a purpose 
that he, for whatever reason, finds suitable.    
 While the aim of this paper is to examine the interaction between authority and discretion, 
we need to first discuss why authority and discretion exist in firms. We concentrate on spelling 
out the costs and benefits of discretion, because our (expanded) notion of authority centers on 
maximizing the net benefits of discretion through the setting of constraints (including the setting 
of goals and vetoing subordinates’ decisions).  Our point of departure is the economics of 
organization.  In this body of literature, discretion is usually treated as the source of moral hazard, 
and thus as a factor that reduces joint surplus value in relationships.  This makes it puzzling why 
discretion should ever be delegated.  However, some tasks may inherently require the 
participation of more than one person, which necessitates some delegation of discretion. Also, 
delegation may be chosen for reasons of economizing with managers’ time (i.e., the opportunity 
costs of managerial inputs).   In addition to these two basic reasons, there are four more reasons 
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why firms may rationally decide to delegate, namely because of expert knowledge, learning, 
distributed judgment, and intrinsic motivation. 3   Consider each in turn.  
 The argument from expert knowledge begins from the observation that the employee may 
be better informed than the manager with respect to how certain tasks should (optimally) be 
carried out. Often such superior knowledge is costly to communicate to the manager (Casson 
1994; Melumad et al. 1995).  Efficient co-location of decision-making rights and knowledge then 
requires that employees are delegated discretion with respect to how they use their expertise in 
problem-solving. 
 According to the argument from learning, delegating discretion to employees will not only 
lead to a better use of the knowledge that they already control, but also to the discovery of new 
knowledge that they would not discover in the absence of delegation (Miles et al. 1997).  For 
example, an employee in the sales department may be delegated the right to make improvements 
on the sales material, change what is displayed in the firm’s showrooms, etc., and thereby 
discover new sales concepts and methods.  In other words, the argument stresses new explorative 
efforts rather than merely improved exploitation of existing knowledge.  In particular, much of 
the discussion of Total Quality Management has stressed that delegation of rights to TQM teams 
leads to improved problem-solving efforts, that is, to a more efficient process of discovery of 
solutions to technical and marketing related problems (e.g., Jensen and Wruck 1994 and 
references therein).    
 The distributed judgment argument compares centralized with decentralized judgment and 
decision-making (Bendor 1985; Sah and Stiglitz 1985; Miller 1992; Argyres and Mui 1999).  A 
general conclusion is that in cases that call for decisions based on judgement, “… dictatorship 
may do very poorly when the problem is one of making collective judgements about difficult 
problems” (Miller 1992: 77). By means of probability theory, Bendor (1985) shows that agents 
working separately on problems are more likely to produce workable results than having agents 
working interactively on a problem.  In this case, delegating discretion amounts to giving 
employees the right to put forward proposals about collective judgments based on their individual 
judgments and to decide between these. 
 Finally, the argument from intrinsic motivation stresses that increasing the delegation of 
discretion to employees likely “… raises the perceived self-determination of employees and 
                                                 
3 Delegation is arguably also undertaken because it eases the provision of high-powered incentives.  However, 
delegation aiming at strengthening incentives requires that the organization is decomposable into rather modular 
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therewith strengthens intrinsic motivation” (Osterloh and Frey 2000: 543), leading to an increase 
in creativity in the pursuit of goals.  Expert knowledge is better utilized and learning is fostered. 
In contrast, decreasing the level of delegated discretion may crowd out intrinsic motivation.  
Much of the empowerment literature has a similar thrust (Conger and Canungo 1988; Vroom and 
Jago 1988; Thomas and Velthouse 1990; Gal-Or and Amit 1998).  
 Note that none of the above arguments consider the trade-offs involved in delegation of 
discretion. Thus, they cannot explain why discretion should be constrained. Relatedly, much 
recent work on new organizational forms (e.g., Osterloh and Frey 2000; Child and McGrath 
2001), as well as the literature on empowerment (Conger and Kanungo 1988; Thomas and 
Velthouse 1990) tend to emphasize the benefit, rather than the cost, side of delegation (but see 
Vroom and Jago 1988 for an exception).  However, writers within the agency literature, address 
the issue of optimum delegation (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Armstrong 1994; Gal-Or and Amit 
1998).  In general, they conclude that delegation creates opportunities for employees to collect 
informational rents and/or engage in morally hazardous activities.  Roughly, optimum delegation 
obtains when the incremental gain from making use of expert knowledge equals the incremental 
costs from loss of control.  The cost caused by control loss is ultimately only rooted in the 
differing preferences of managers and employees in the relevant hierarchy and the costs of 
monitoring relevant aspects of the employee’s activities.  Thus, the agency approach abstracts 
from costs of delegation of discretion that are not the result of moral hazard, but which may still 
arise in systems of interdependent decision-making.  As a crude generalization, the less 
decomposable (i.e., the more complex) (Simon 1962) such systems are, the more such costs are 
likely to be present.  Among the costs of delegation in complex firms are the following ones: 
 Common goods problems.  These are problems of overuse of assets and other 
inefficiencies that develop when rights to control the relevant assets are imperfectly specificed 
and/or monitored.  Such problems may arise in an organizational context when discretion is 
delegated to employees. First-come/first-served and other mechanisms arise to allocate the 
services of the assets.   However, such mechanisms may be inefficient compared to allocation by 
means of authority.  
 Problems of mutual adaptation.  These are problems of coordinating actions, typically in 
response to some contingency, that include problems of scheduling and other problems that arise 
when complementary actions are involved.  Problems of excessive information collection 
                                                                                                                                                         
components (Zenger 2002).  Thus, it is decomposability rather than delegation that paves the way for the use of 
high-powered incentives.    
 7
(Casson 1994) (including duplicative R&D) also fall within this category.   While these problems 
may be handled through, for example, communication, such mechanisms may be less efficient 
than authority.  Mutual adaptation may be particularly ill-suited to handle situations where a firm 
is trying to coordinate actions in an effort to do something “… that is outside its experience, such 
as introducing a new kind of product, entering a new market, or adopting a new approach to 
manufacturing” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 92).  
 Subgoal pursuit.  The results of subgoal include cannibalization of product markets and 
other instances of decentralized actions being inconsistent with the firm’s overall strategic 
planning.  These mistakes may be made by entirely well-intentioned employees (cf. Hendry 
2002).  The reduction of subgoal pursuit is conventionally seen as a key management task.  
The Interaction Between Authority and Discretion 
 In much of the literature, there has been a tendency to discuss the issues of authority and 
discretion separately.4 However, this is problematic because the interaction between authority and 
discretion gives rise to distinct organizational problems.  Thus, complex firms may have 
intrinsically motivated employees and/or employees with a direct financial stake in the outcomes 
of activities that they through delegated discretion are able to influence.  On the other hand, 
managers acting in the belief that they possess superior knowledge about the nature of the 
interdependencies in the organization exercise authority in order to improve coordination.  
However, this may clash with one of the main supposed benefits of delegation, namely the 
improvement of motivation.  This is the fundamental tension between authority and discretion.  
We treat this and its organizational implications in the following sections. 
     
Authority and Discretion: Tensions,  
Credible Commitments, and Implicit Contracts 
In this section we begin by illustrating by means of a simple graphical framework a basic 
tradeoff that arises in the allocation of discretion.  We then examine reasons why managers 
may intervene and overrule decisions made on the basis of delegated discretion, and how this 
                                                 
4 The economics of organization offer explanations of both authority and discretion. However, these are 
forwarded separately, and the interaction between authority and discretion is seldom inquired into. Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) and Baker et al. (1999) are exceptions to this. Agency theory may seem to allow for this interaction, 
but can only treat authority in the very narrow sense of monitoring, which is clearly an aspect of the exercise of 
authority (e.g., Melumad et al. 1995).   
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may harm motivation.  We finally address the various means, such as explicit credible 
commitments and implicit contracts, through which harmful managerial intervention may be 
circumscribed.   It is necessary to state some simplifying assumptions that we make in the 
following: 1) What is delegated?  Delegation only encompasses delegation of discretion, not 
of authority. We make this simplifying assumption in order to highlight the interaction 
between authority and discretion, and avoid complicating issues of delegation of authority, 
which do not seem to add extra content to the analysis.  2) The sources of discretion:  We 
assume that discretion is delegated by managers who have the power to implement their 
preferred their degree of discretion.  For reasons of tractability, we suppress that discretion 
may be captured by employees, for example, because they have the bargaining power that 
allows them to do so (Aoki 1984).  3) Levels of analysis.  We assume that if one employee is 
overruled, this will have negative motivational consequences for all employees.  This 
establishes a link between the organizational level and the individual level.   These 
assumptions may be strong ones; however, they are necessary for keeping the discussion 
simple and allow us to highlight the interaction between authority and discretion. However, we 
later relax these assumptions.  
Delegating and Changing Discretion  
 As argued earlier, there are both beneficial and negative implications for firms of 
delegating discretion to employees.  Thus, firms confront a basic trade-off that may be 
illustrated as in figure 1.    
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 Here XXXXXXXX 
On the horizontal axis is the degree of discretion delegated to an employee or a business unit.  
This may be interpreted as a composite measure of a host of variables, such as job-descriptions 
(which in themselves may contain many variables), monetary budgets (Jensen and Meckling 
1992), rights to work with certain assets (Rajan and Zingales 1998), rights to communicate 
with and refer to other employees (Demski et al. 1997), rights to define goals for activities 
(Armstrong 1994), rights to initiate projects (Fama and Jensen 1983; Aghion and Tirole 1997), 
etc. Clearly, because of the multi-dimensionality of delegating discretion, representing it as a 
one-dimensional measure is quite crude.  The vertical axis shows costs and benefits measured 
in some unit (e.g., Dollars).     
 The B-curve shows the benefits from increasing delegation. We assume that employees 
value being given more discretion.  This may be explained by employees becoming more 
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intrinsically motivated or by employees being able to reap more private benefits (e.g., 
augmenting their human capital) as delegation increases.   The relation is portrayed as a 
strictly concave one, because we assume that the manager first allocates discretion to 
employees in the most productive dimensions.5 There is also a cost aspect to giving the 
employee larger discretion, as discussed above.  The C-curve shows these costs. The curve is 
assumed to be convex, because as delegation increases, decision rights will increasingly 
overlap across tasks and functions, leading to the costs of delegation of discretion increasing at 
an increasing rate. 
 Note that spillover effects are an important part of the construction of the B and C 
curves.  In the case of the B curve, spillover effects enter in the form of the four rationales that 
we provided above for delegating discretion. In the case of the C curve, spillover effects enter, 
for example, in the form of moral hazard in addition to the costs identified earlier.   
 Given the B and C curves, the optimum degree of delegation is given by D1*. Here, the 
difference (i.e., the joint surplus) between costs (C curve) and benefits (B1) is at its maximum. 
We take this situation as our benchmark situation.  We suppress the learning or evolutionary 
process that leads to this, as well as any exercise of power on the part of employees that may 
hinder reaching the optimum.  There are four overall reasons why the degree of delegation 
preferred and implemented by management may deviate from D1*, that is, the one that 
maximizes the organization’s performance.  First, management may decide that the degree of 
delegation should change as a response to changing outside contingencies.  Second, 
management may change its perceptions of the firm’s overall strategy and the internal 
resource allocation (including the degree of delegation) that may support this strategy. Third, 
management may realize private benefits from deviating from the degree of delegation that is 
optimal for the firm.  Finally, management may suffer from time inconsistency.   These are 
considered in the following. 
 Changing outside contingencies.  We assume that the firm is initially in equilibrium 
with respect to the degree of delegation.  Changing contingencies upset this equilibrium, 
because it introduces new kinds of interdependencies in decision-making, thus requiring 
adaptation in terms of the delegation of discretion.  For example, outside technological 
changes require the building-up of a new product platform.  Such new technologies typically 
require new interface standards, which may require the delegation of more discretion to 
                                                 
5 “Manager” may be substituted with “corporate headquarters,” “CEO,” etc.  “Employee” may be 
substituted with “business unit,” “team,” etc. 
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designers and engineers in order to stimulate exploration through wide bandwidth 
communication channels. Or, a change in the competitive conditions, such as an impending 
price war, may dictate that discretion is diminished in order to curb slack and reduce costs.  If 
such changes in contingencies could be foreseen, changes in the delegation of discretion could 
be fully programmed.  However, many contingencies cannot be foreseen, or it is too costly to 
try to do so.  Because complex interdependencies in decision-making may still exist even 
under substantial delegation,6 major changes in contingencies are likely to require coordinated 
adaptation; thus, there may still be a need for the exercise of authority.  Disregarding for the 
moment negative motivation effects, coordination by means of authority is preferable when 
management has a superior understanding of how contingencies influence interdependencies 
and how this impacts on the preferred degree of delegation. When contingencies change 
frequently, the exercise of authority with respect to defining and redefining the degree of 
delegation will be a recurrent task.  Since there may be learning and scale-advantages in this 
activity and since the relevant underlying knowledge will be costly to communicate (Casson 
1994), this kind of exercise of authority will be concentrated on specific persons. 
 Changing managerial perceptions. The degree of delegation may change because of 
changed managerial perceptions, even if no outside contingencies change. For example, a 
change in the management team may cause the team’s “image” (Penrose 1959) of the firm’s 
opportunity set to change.  This situation introduces the same kind of changes in the internal 
resource allocation, including the degree of delegation that was analyzed above.   
 Private benefits.  In the above two cases, management was assumed to act in the interests 
of the firm.  However, in actuality, managers may derive private benefits from actions that 
destroy value.  This may imply that their preferred degree of delegation deviates from the 
optimum.  In particular, time patterns of organizational and private costs and benefits may be 
such that managers have incentives to choose sub-optimal actions.  For example, managers who 
are up for promotion may derive private benefits from reducing delegation so as to strongly cut 
the costs of the slack and negative spillover effects associated with a high level of delegation of 
discretion, because this is a signal of their managerial ability.  If the organizational costs of this 
come later than the private benefits to managers, the latter have an incentive to reduce the level of 
delegation below the optimum.  Incentive schemes (e.g., stock options) that tie behavior to 
                                                 
6 Indeed, delegation may introduce more interdependencies between organizational units.  For example, 
delegation may imply more extensive interaction with other organizational units. Also, delegation may imply 
more extensive rights to draw on corporate resources (e.g., as in a matrix organization).    
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organizational performance may not be able to cope with this problem, because managers may 
have left the firm or the position in favor of another firm or position. 
 Time inconsistency.  The problem of time inconsistency is well known from political 
economy (e.g., Kiser and Barzel 1991; Moe 1997).  For example, governments have an 
incentive to initially promise to not confiscate (too much of) the wealth created by 
entrepreneurs in order to strengthen their incentives to actually undertake investments, and 
then, in some later period, deviate from this promise and confiscate substantial portions of the 
created wealth.  Along similar lines, firms may induce employees to undertake investments in 
their human capital that are specific to the firm, promising that employees will be able to share 
substantially in the extra surplus.  When the human capital of employees is sufficiently 
specific, firms may then renege on the promise, holding-up employees.  In the context of 
delegation, this kind of behavior may consist in, first, promising substantial discretion.  When 
employees, happy with their new extended discretion, come up with profit-improving ideas 
about how to improve products, processes, etc., managers may harvest these, decide that the 
organization already has its hands full with implementing the ideas, and that the level of 
delegated discretion may be usefully reduced in order to save costs.  
Managerial Intervention and Employee Motivation  
 The managerial exercise of authority may harm employee motivation in two overall 
ways, namely, first, when employees, making decisions on the basis of discretion delegated to 
them, are overruled by managers, and, second, when the delegation of discretion is limited in 
ways that are perceived by employees to be unjust, arbitrary, etc.  Both kinds of exercise of 
authority amount to reneging on implicit contracts with employees. They may be seen as 
instances of “managerial opportunism” (Dow 1987).  Unfortunate consequences for 
motivation, and in turn firm performance, may follow.     
 Work in organizational behavior on psychological contracts (Rousseau 1989) has 
implications for understanding how the use of authority which is being perceived by 
employees as being unfair, arbitrary, and in other ways break what is regarded as established 
psychological or implicit contracts, may harm motivation.7 The psychological literature on 
cognitive biases suggests further reasons why motivation may be harmed by managerial 
action.  In an employee relationship, employees develop implicit and explicit expectations to 
                                                 
7 In particular, “organizational citizenship behavior”  that is, employee behavior which promotes organizational 
efficiency but is not (perhaps, cannot be) explicitly recognized by an organization’s reward system  may suffer 
from this kind of action (Robinson and Morrison 1995). 
 12
the contract governing the relationship, and particularly to the benefits that they believe they 
deserve under the implicit contract, that is, their “entitlements” (Heath et al. 1993).  For 
example, the level of discretion represented by D1* may become a “status quo” point, in the 
sense that it represents what employees believe are their entitlements.  Thus, if employs enjoy 
considerable discretion this may become part of their (perceived) entitlements. Other parts of 
psychological research points to the phenomenon of loss aversion, that is, a loss relative to a 
status quo point is seen as more undesirable than a gain relative to the same point is seen as 
desirable.  This means that employees will develop a bias against changing the level of 
discretion in a downwards direction, and that they can be expected to resist such changes, as 
well as suffer a loss of motivation if the change is, in fact, forced upon them.   Because of 
these psychological effects, managerial overruling of employees is likely to harm intrinsic 
motivation, as well as employees’ willingness to learn, exploit their local knowledge and 
willingness to offer their opinions and judgments on organizational development.  Recall that 
these are the determinants of the B curve.  Thus, motivation losses caused by managerial 
intervention may be represented in figure 1 by B1* shifting to B2*, which corresponds to a 
lower level of discretion and lower joint surplus.  Thus, employees cut back on efforts.  In a 
longer-run perspective they may also lower their investments in accumulating firm-specific 
human capital.   
 The problem of loss of motivation caused by managerial overruling related to, though 
not identical to, what Williamson (1996) calls the “impossibility of selective intervention.” He 
motivates this problem by asking 
… “Why can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can and 
more.” By merely replicating the market the firm can do no worse than the market.  
And if the firm can intervene selectively (namely, intervene always but only when 
expected net gains can be projected), then the firm will sometimes do better.  Taken 
together, the firm will do at least as well as, and will sometimes do better than, the 
market (1996:150).  
In terms of figure 1, selective intervention would thus mean that a manager could selective 
intervene to lower the C curve, while keeping the B curve unchanged.  However, Williamson 
directly argues that selective intervention of this kind is ”impossible.”  This has to with issues of, 
“Why aren’t more degrees of freedom always better than less?” (idem.), that is, why isn’t 
maximum freedom to exercise authority always preferred?  Suppose such maximum freedom 
obtained.  In this situation, employees’ motivation may suffer, because the option to intervene 
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(i.e., exercise authority) ”… can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) 
and for bad (to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151).  In fact, 
promises to only intervene for good cause can never be credible, Williamson argues, because they 
are not enforceable in a court of law.   A number of issues emerge from this line of analysis.   
 First, it may be very difficult for employees to distinguish between the exercise of authority 
that is motivated by “good causes” (i.e., adaptation to outside contingencies, adopting new 
strategies, curbing public good problems and subgoal pursuit) and the kind that is motivated by 
“bad causes”  (i.e., private benefits and time inconsistency).   This is not to say that it is 
impossible for employees to make the distinction.  Conflicts over resources between employees 
may arise, and managerial decisions that mitigate these conflicts may be fully respected by the 
involved parties as means of arbitration. Moreover, exercise of authority that harms employees 
(e.g., leads to layoffs) may still not lead to drop in motivation, particularly in times of a severe 
organizational crisis. However, there is a substantial intermediate range where it is costly for 
employee to ascertain whether authority is in fact exercised for good or for bad causes.  The 
implication is that to the extent that management wishes to not to harm motivation, it must accept 
that it will to forego some good reasons for intervention to avoid these being mistaken by 
employees for intervention for bad reasons.  Thus, there is fundamental tradeoff here. 
 Second, an important issue is under which conditions delegation is credible.   Williamson 
argues that promises to only exercise authority for good causes are not credible, because they are 
not court-enforceable.  Similarly, promises to delegate and not to interfere with this delegation are 
not court-enforceable, either. In other words, delegation is not formally contractible.  This may 
seem to imply that authority and discretion can only reside at the top, since they cannot credibly 
be delegated.  This would imply that we should witness little or no use of delegation.  However, 
we do seem to observe delegation that is long-lasting, stable and credible.  This implies that 
although delegation may not be court-enforceable, it can be enforced by other means (Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy 1999, 2001), like other implicit contracts (Klein and Leffler 1981).  We 
discuss this latter issue in the following section.  
The Enforcement of Credible Delegation  
 So far, it has been suggested exercise of authority that is perceived as being unfair, 
arbitrary, ungrounded, overruling, etc. may badly harm motivation, so that, in terms of figure 1, 
the benefit curve is shifted from B1* to B2*.  However, as the figure shows, this shift is associated 
with a diminished joint surplus.   It was argued earlier that for various reasons managers may 
 14
exercise authority in ways that deviate from the optimum, using the example of choosing 
inoptimal levels of delegation.  The same kind of reasoning applies to managerial action that 
overrules employees (keeping the formal level of delegation constant).   Clearly, it is in the firm’s 
long-run interest to avoid this kind of managerial behavior.  There are a number of ways in which 
this may be accomplished.  First, management may establish credible commitments to not break 
promises with respect to delegation).  Second, various organization-specific factors may make it 
too costly for management to exercise authority that may harm motivation, irrespective of 
whether explicit commitments have been issued.  Third, outside forces may constrain the harmful 
exercise of authority.   
  Credible commitments.  In the present context, the political economy concept of credible 
commitment implies that management explicitly commits to a non-interference policy, and this is 
made credible by means of somehow constraining the flexibility of managers.  Notably, managers 
may stake their personal reputations (Miller 1992; Argyres and Mui 1999).  This may be done 
through symbolic and communicative acts, for example, announcing in large-scale company 
gatherings one’s firm commitment to certain policies and values (Brockner et al. 1992).  It can 
also be done through consistently abstaining from harmful intervention (Kiser and Barzel 1991).  
The latter possibility suggests that if management for some reason wishes to break implicit 
contracts through harmful exercise of authority, they should do so in the initial period, and 
abstain from any such actions in all later periods.     
 However, credible commitments are far from perfect with respect to constraining 
opportunistic behaviors (Williamson 1996). For example, there is a “last-period problem” (Klein 
and Leffler 1991), because managers change jobs and may not carry their reputation with them, 
or may be close to retirement.   Moreover, many firms are so large and complex that the 
informational requirements for the effective working of reputation effects are not met.  This may 
particularly hold for middle managers that are much less visible than top managers.  The effect is 
to dampen the commitment creating effect of reputations. This reasoning predicts that we would 
expect relatively more harmful exercise of authority from managers who are about to change jobs 
or retire or occupy middle-management positions.  Also, unexpected contingencies  for 
example, some new open promotion possibility arrives unexpectedly and seizing it may be eased 
by a tough stance towards costs  may mean that management faces situations where the 
benefits of breaking commitments overwhelm the costs, even in the long run. (i.e., the implicit 
contracts are driven out of their self-enforcing range, Klein 1991). 
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  Organization-specific factors.  Even if no explicit commitments to not engage in harmful 
exercise of authority are issued, there are still a number of features of the organization of the firm 
that may serve the purpose as credible commitments.  
 First, hierarchical structure itself plays a role.  Thus, delegated discretion may be partly 
protected if lower level managers are required to refer to higher-level managers for authorization 
to overrule decisions made by of employee’s. This will be case if upper and lower-level managers 
differ in their preferences for overruling, for example, lower-level managers derive a private 
benefit from overruling, whereas upper-level managers do not (Aghion and Tirole 1997). Another 
reason why hierarchical structure may constrain managerial intervention is that the hierarchy is 
not just a structure of authority, but also one of information (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1974).  
Thus, there will be an informational distance between those possessing authority and those to 
whom discretion has been delegated.  The size of this informational distance influences the basis 
for exercising judgment with respect to decisions whether to overrule employees or not.   All else 
being equal, the more hierarchical layers that information has to pass through before reaching the 
level exercising authority, the less adequate is this basis likely to be.  Moreover, even though 
there may be few hierarchical layers, managerial task descriptions may be such that managers 
will essentially be overloaded if they insist on being sufficiently informed to be in a position to 
overrule.  If a manager understands that because of information overload, she is not in a position 
to rationally decide whether to overrule or not, she should not overrule (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  
In sum, this reasoning predicts that overruling of employees is less likely to place in firms with 
large informational distances and/or managers that are heavily informationally burdened.   
  Some employees or groups of employee may also be particularly costly for management to 
overrule, because their discretion is not only formally delegated, but also strongly grounded in the 
real control of critical resources, notably specialized human capital, ability to charismatic 
leadership, a favorable reputation with certain customers, etc.  For example, Henry Ford II and 
the rest of the Ford top management team tolerated the open disagreement with official Ford 
strategy expressed by Lee Iacocca and his clique of loyal managers, because of the marketing 
skills exercised by Iacocca and his men (Halberstam 1986).    
 Finally, the firms’s reward systems may play a role.  Notably, it may be more costly for a 
manager in terms of lost motivation if he overrules employees whose rewards are dependent upon 
results  for example, rewards may be dependent upon team-output  than if he overrules 
employees who are paid a fixed wage.  This is because the results on which the employee’s 
rewards depend may never materialize if the manager overrules him.   In contrast, an employee 
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that is on a fixed wage contract will receive the same salary regardless of whether he is overruled 
or not.8  In sum, the more “high-powered” the incentive systems, the less managerial overruling 
we would expect to see.  
 Outside forces.  With respect to outside forces that may enforce the delegation of 
discretion, important examples are strong trade unions or professional associations.  Their 
influence may imply that certain rights are so strongly protected (i.e., they are outside the “zone 
of acceptance,” Simon 1951) that management cannot realistically change these (Argyres and 
Liebeskind 1999).  For example, employees may gain informal rights to influence the planning of 
the weekly work schedules (i.e., informal delegation of discretion), and trade unions may 
effectively enforce these rights.  Sometimes such rights are, in fact, often made court-enforceable. 
Competitive forces also constrain harmful managerial exercise of authority.  In particular, 
competition for employees is an important constraint.  Thus, frustrated employees are more likely 
to be bid away by competitor firms. Moreover, financial markets constrain harmful managerial 
exercise of authority, as least as a rough tendency, because these actions have a negative impact 
on profitability. 
Summing Up  
 So far we have identified variables that determine the costs and benefits of delegation of 
discretion (suppressing the problems stemming from managerial intervention), as well as 
variables that influence the propensity of managers to intervene in delegated discretion, and, 
finally, a set of variables that influence the enforceability of implicit contracts and explicit 
commitments to not intervene in this manner.   Our framework may be summed up as in figure 2.  
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 2 Here XXXXXXXX 
Recall our earlier argument that the set of variables that influence the enforceability of implicit 
contracts and explicit commitments to not intervene in a harmful manner differs across 
organizational forms.  This suggests that important parts of the organizational costs associated 
with alternative organizational forms are 1) the costs stemming from harmful managerial 
intervention, and 2) the costs of establishing implicit contracts and explicit commitments to not 
intervene.  In the following section, we apply this framework to a comparison of the traditional 
Weberian hierarchy to new organizational forms.    
                                                 
8 Issues of intrinsic motivation may clearly complicate the situation.   The motivation of intrinsically motivated 
employees that are on a flat wage may be harmed as badly by overruling as extrinsically motivated employees 
that receive performance pay. 
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Implications for New Organizational Forms  
An Organizational Dilemma? 
 The above analysis seems to lead to the recognition that organizations are unavoidably 
caught in a fundamental dilemma.  Thus, the analysis implies that a basic organizational 
choice is one between organizations with constant managerial intervention to ensure 
adaptation, but highly frustrated employees, on the one hand, and very rigid organizations with 
highly motivated employees on the other hand.  However, this dilemma may be resolved in 
two ways.  The obvious way is that the organization is placed in environments that are so 
stable that there is not much need for managerial exercise of authority.  The less obvious way 
is that by making the organization more decomposed (Simon 1962) better adaptability can be 
achieved with less need for intervention on the part of management, so that motivation is not 
harmed.  It is exactly the property of improving adaptability while keeping motivation 
constant, or even improving it, that some writers argue characterize “new organizational 
forms” (Miles et al. 1997), a subset of which we analyze in this section. 
New Organizational Forms 
 Many writers have noted that firms, particularly those in knowledge-intensive industries, 
are increasingly experimenting with the ways in which they structure their boundaries (e.g., 
Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000) and their internal organization (e.g., Miles et al. 1997).  
They do this in order to increase their ability to absorb and build knowledge, so as to become 
”information age organizations” (Mendelsson and Pillai 1999). These experiments with 
economic organization are often referred to by the notion of “new organizational form” (Daft 
and Lewin 1993).  New organizational forms may be classified as either external hybrids 
(Williamson 1996), that is, market exchanges infused with elements of hierarchical control, or 
internal hybrids (Zenger and Hesterly 1997; Zenger 2002), that is, hierarchical forms infused 
with elements of market control.  “Market control” is to be understood in a broad sense to not 
just refer to internal prices and the use of high-powered performance schemes, but also to 
encompass delegation, stimulation of local entrepreneurial initiative, the use of semi-
independent teams, etc., and other organizational elements that mimic market organization. 
Thus, in the context of internal organization, these forms are characterized by relying upon 
cross-functional processes, extensive delayering, and empowerment (Child and McGrath 
2001: 137).  The aim is to create highly specialized and motivated units by means of extensive 
delegation of discretion. Cross-functional processes substitute for hierarchy in the coordination 
 18
of tasks.  Some writers (e.g., Ravasi and Verona 2000) argue that a main benefit of new 
organizational forms is that they introduce “structural ambiguity” (i.e., unclear 
and/overlapping tasks and roles), which further creativity, knowledge sharing and 
innovativeness, but also complicates coordinating tasks.   Here, we apply the preceding 
discussion to new organizational forms.  Specifically, we concentrate on internal hybrids with 
a high degree of delegation of discretion, and compare these to more traditional hierarchies.9   
Delegation of Discretion and Interdependencies in Internal Hybrids 
 Internal hybrids increase the level of delegation of discretion compared to the traditional 
hierarchical form (Child and McGrath 2001).  Much of the design philosophy behind new 
organizational forms is to enable effective local adaptation, for example, to changes in customers’ 
needs, specifications, etc. by means of this.  Accordingly, much of the literature stresses the 
autonomy, independence, etc. of organizational units.   Although certain internal hybrids may 
represent more decomposed organizational forms than traditional hierarchical forms, some 
interdependencies between units persist.  Authority may be a low-cost way of handling such 
interdependencies, that is, “intervention for good causes.”  
 The literature on internal hybrid forms is not clear with respect to how interdependencies 
are managed, perhaps because it is usually not made clear how decomposed these organizational 
forms really are.   Two somewhat opposed accounts can be found. On the one hand, it is argued 
that employees in new organizational forms are knowledgeable, multi-skilled and motivated, but 
still agree upon goals. In terms of figure 1, this implies that the C curve is flat.  Given this, the 
scope for coordination of interdependent activities by means of authority may indeed be quite 
limited.  Management merely plays the role of mediating with respect to goals and conflicts 
(Child and McGrath 2001: 1138). On the other hand, specialization is strongly stressed, with a 
strong emphasis on breaking the organization up in small, semi-independent and specialized units 
that work on the basis of localized, specialized and even tacit knowledge.  Given the latter 
characterization of the organization, coordination problems are bound to arise, for example, 
because sub-goal pursuit becomes pronounced.  In terms of figure 1, this implies that the C curve 
is steep.  
 As discussed earlier, some coordination problems may be efficiently handled by 
organizational units themselves, namely when the costs of resolving coordination problems by 
                                                 
9 Note that as we use the terminology of “internal hybrids” this excludes the traditional M-form, notably because 
the traditional M-form does not use cross-functional teams.  Radical matrix forms may, however, be internal 
hybrids in our sense.  
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dialogue and mutual adaptation are lower than the costs of using the authority mechanism.  The 
greater the extent to which complex interdependencies characterizes the organization, the less 
likely is it that coordination problems will be efficiently handled through dialogue and mutual 
adaptation.  This paves the way for the exercise of authority as a means to resolve coordination 
problems, that is, intervention for good reasons.  In addition, new organizational forms are not 
immune to problems that stem from intervention for bad reasons.  This implies that we can utilize 
the insights developed in the preceding sections to analyze new organizational forms in terms of 
how well they cope with these problems relative to other organizational forms, such as traditional 
hierarchies.  
Comparing Traditional Hierarchies and Internal Hybrids 
 It was earlier argued that there are a number of factors that may enforce promises or 
implicit contracts with respect to not exercising authority in a harmful (i.e., de-motivating) 
manner. We submit that the incidence of these factors differ systematically across organizational 
forms.  Thus, Table 1 presents how we hypothesize the incidence of the factors in internal hybrids 
(as defined above) and traditional hierarchies.  By the latter we make reference to organizations 
characterized by fixed roles, fixed lines of communication and command, multiple layers of 
authority, functional specialization, the resolution of unexpected contingencies being referred to a 
hierarchical superior, and low-powered incentives.  This incidence is measured on the scale (0, +, 
++) with intermediate values given as, for example (0/+).  In the following, reasons are provided 
for the specific values in the cells.   We emphasize that the specific values are highly conjectural 
and depend on contextual factors, such as how exactly a given internal hybrid is structured.  
XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 Here XXXXXXXX 
 Credible commitments. Credible commitments in the form of managers staking personal 
reputations with respect to not overrule employees are more difficult to establish in internal 
hybrids than in traditional hierarchies. In the latter, roles and positions are well established and it 
is, in principle, easy to ascertain which manager overruled a given decision.  In contrast, in 
internal hybrids authority is more dispersed. For example, in some kinds of project organization, 
decisions may be overruled, not just by the project leader, but also by various managers who are 
associated with the project and have stakes in it.  This implies that it is more costly for employees 
to ascertain the reputation of a given manager. Because reputational mechanisms are more 
imperfect in internal hybrids, this is a force pulling towards more harmful managerial exercise of 
authority.   
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 Differing preferences in the managerial hierarchy. A key difference between traditional 
hierarchies and internal hybrids lies in the number of hierarchical layers: It is lower in the latter 
than in the former.  A factor that reduces the probability of being overruled is having a hierarchy 
with managers with differing preferences with respect to the exercise of authority. Because 
internal hybrids make use of less hierarchy than traditional hierarchies, this mechanism will be 
less prevalent in internal hybrids.  This is a force pulling towards more harmful managerial 
exercise of authority 
 Information structure. Information structures are quite different in traditional hierarchies 
and in internal hybrids.  Thus, in the traditional hierarchy, communication structures span 
multiple layers of hierarchy; some information loss as decisions move up the hierarchy is 
unavoidable.  In the internal hybrid, information loss is likely lower, because the number of 
hierarchical layers is lower.  In internal hybrids, managers will therefore have a better 
informational basis for exercising their authority.  Again, this is a force pulling towards more 
harmful managerial exercise of authority in internal hybrids.  
 Critical resources. In general, managers will be reluctant to overrule employees who 
control critical resources, particularly the less specific these employees are to the firm.  This 
mechanism is more likely to be present in internal hybrids than in traditional hierarchies.   In fact, 
a motivation for adopting internal hybrids is exactly to make use of employees’ critical 
knowledge resources.  The control of critical resources gives employees more bargaining power 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998) and makes it more costly for a manager to overrule them.  This is a 
force pulling towards less harmful managerial  exercise of authority in internal hybrids relative to 
traditional hierarchies. 
 Reward systems. These are usually higher-powered in internal hybrids than in traditional 
hierarchies (Zenger 2002). This means that more will be at stake for employees if they are 
overruled. This is a force pulling towards less harmful managerial  exercise of authority in 
internal hybrids.  
 Trade unions and professional associations. The traditional hierarchy is more likely than 
the internal hybrid to be found in traditional industries than in new services, software 
development, E-business and the like.  Trade unions and professional associations are more 
prevalent as outside enforcers of internal, perhaps implicit, agreements in more traditional 
industries. This is a force pulling towards less harmful managerial  exercise of authority in 
traditional hierarchies.   
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 Competitive forces. Competitive forces constrain managerial intervention most directly 
through capital and labor markets.   The constraining effects of labor markets may be strongest in 
the case of internal hybrids, since these are often based on specialist employees who may be in 
very strong demand.  It does not seem possible to say anything definite on a priori grounds about 
the constraining effects of capital markets, since this seems to be entirely contextually 
determined.  The overall effect of competitive forces with respect to discriminating between 
traditional hierarchy and internal hybrids in terms of harmful managerial exercise of authority is, 
therefore, indeterminate.   
 The above considerations are not sufficient to determine whether there will be more or less 
harmful managerial exercise of authority in a traditional hierarchy relative to an internal hybrid.   
This is because we do not know on a priori grounds the relative contribution of the various 
factors to the enforcement of implicit contracts and explicit commitments (e.g., are reward 
systems more important than trade unions?).  Ultimately, this can only be settled on empirical 
grounds.   Still, it may be hypothesized that it is more costly to sustain commitments and implicit 
contracts to not exercise authority for bad reasons in an internal hybrid than in a traditional 
hierarchy.  We offer the following reasons in support of this contention.  First, design principles 
for a traditional hierarchy are better understood and disseminated than for internal hybrids.  This 
means that designing an internal hybrid is more uncertain and that more design errors are likely to 
take place.   Such errors (e.g., in the allocation of discretion) are likely to be corrected by 
subsequent management action.  Second, tasks and task definitions are usually more unclearly 
defined in internal hybrids; in fact, this is sometimes mentioned as a benefit of internal hybrids 
(Ravasi and Verona 2000).  However, there is also a cost side to this, namely negative spillover 
effects, requiring subsequent management action.  Our intuition is that these are sufficient to tilt 
the balance, so that on average, there will be more potentially harmful exercise of authority in 
internal hybrids than in traditional hierarchies.  
 We strongly emphasize that our arguments does not imply that internal hybrids may never 
be preferred organizational forms.  First, although internal hybrids may indeed suffer relatively 
more from the problem of harmful managerial intervention than traditional hierarchies, and 
therefore in general be less stable, they may possess offsetting advantages. For example, on 
average they may be associated with higher innovativeness and greater adaptability than 
traditional hierarchical forms (Ravasi and Verona 2000).  Thus, benefits may differ across the 
two forms.  A full analysis of the choice of organizational form must take such benefits into 
account.  Second, the problem of sustaining commitments and implicit contracts to not exercise 
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authority for bad reasons directs attention to the ways in which management can actively 
influence the values and beliefs of employees through strong dissemination of information, the 
building of corporate value bases, recruitment of employees with preferences similar to 
management, etc.  We hypothesize that there will be more of these kind of managerial activities 
in internal hybrids than in traditional hierarchical forms.    
Conclusions 
Firms make use of authority and they delegate discretion.  They make use of authority because 
authority is often a low cost means of handling spillover effects that arise when employees’ 
actions are interdependent.  They delegate discretion for a number of reasons, among them 
because they wish to better utilize expert knowledge, stimulate intrinsic motivation and 
entrepreneurship, etc.  However, the main point in this paper is that the use of authority may 
conflict with the delegation of discretion. The problem arises because “contracts” to delegate 
discretion are not enforceable in a court of law.  Credible delegation may therefore be hard to 
sustain.  However, we have pointed to and analyzed how various mechanisms help to enforce 
the implicit contracts that may make delegation credible, how these mechanisms differ across 
organizational forms, and how they, therefore, influence governance choice.   
 This has allowed us to contribute to a number of literatures.  Thus, we have provided a 
more extensive treatment than is usual in organizational economics of commitment problems 
and their organizational ramifications. Although space considerations have ruled out an 
extensive treatment of this, our analysis also contributes to understanding the rationales of 
particular organizational mechanisms in terms of their contribution to enforcing implicit 
contracts and commitments.  We contribute to the literature on delegation (including parts of 
the literature on empowerment) by stressing the interaction between authority and discretion in 
firms.  We establish connections to the literature on psychological contracts in organizations.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on new organizational forms by concentrating on the 
organizational costs of such forms, and by arguing that these are likely to be more heavily 
burdened by the problem of harmful managerial exercise of authority.  
 With respect to managerial implications, our discussion supports the view that the 
managerial role should be more concentrated on influencing employees’ beliefs and values 
than on directly intervening with employees’ affairs.  Also, the managerial role is to a large 
extent influenced by organizational form.  For example, flat organizations that are 
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characterized by strong interdependencies between decisions are particularly prone to 
commitment problems, and in such organizations, managerial reputations for being 
consistently fair may be particularly important.   
 Future research on these issues may proceed along the following lines.  First, existing 
empirical evidence as well as relevant theoretical insights should be compared to the 
framework developed here in order to gauge the limitations of, challenge, and, ultimately, 
refine the framework.  For example, there is much to learn from existing work on 
psychological contracts in organizations with respect to understanding why certain managerial 
actions are perceived as reneging on implicit contracts (while others aren’t) and why such 
behavior harms employee motivation.  Second, empirical work informed by the present 
framework should be carried out.  In particular, Table 1 represents a set of, in principle, 
empirically testable hypotheses. Third, theoretical work may concentrate on extending the 
framework beyond the comparison of traditional hierarchies and internal hybrids to also 
include other organizational forms.  We are confident that future work along these lines will 
prove fruitful. 
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Degree of 
delegation
Costs of delegation:    
1) common goods 
problems, 2) problems  of 
mutual adaptation, and 3) 
subgoal pursuit. 
Benefits of 
delegation: 
1) expert knowledge, 2) 
learning, 3) distributed 
judgment, and 4) intrinsic 
motivation.
Managerial 
intervention: 
1) changing 
contingencies, 2) 
changing 
perceptions, 3) 
private benefits, 
and 4) time 
inconsistency.
Factors 
enforcing 
implicit 
contracts and 
commitments 
(credible 
commitments, 
hierarchical 
structure, etc.) 
Figure 2: Determinants of Degree of Delegation
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Table 1: Organizational Form and Credible Commitment 
 
                                      Organizational Forms 
 Traditional Hierarchy Internal Hybrid 
Credible 
commitments, e.g. 
managers staking 
personal reputations 
++ + 
Differing preferences 
in the managerial 
hierarchy  
++ 0 
Informational 
structure (distance 
and overload)  
 
++ 0/+ 
Employees control 
critical resources 
0/+ ++ 
Reward systems 
 
0/+ ++ 
Trade unions and 
professional 
bassociations 
++ 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors that 
enforce 
promises 
and  
implicit 
contracts 
Competitive forces Strongly context dependent Strongly context dependent 
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